EXP3604 Spring 2008

Exam #4 Form B (n = 30)

1. Availability and representativeness are two strategies that people appear to use to
(a) solve problems of deductive logic
(b) overcome functional fixedness
(c) judge the likelihood of events or conditions (25)
(d) think creatively

2. The Gestalt psychologists’ approach to problem solving, much like their approach to perception, stressed the importance of
(a) how a problem was represented and structured (28)
(b) prior knowledge and “top-down” processes
(c) systematic search of the “problem space”
(d) collaborative “brainstorming” and creativity

3. The essence of the “means-end” strategy for tackling problems is to try to
(a) get a good night’s sleep before tackling difficult problems
(b) identify the means available to reach the solution
(c) remembering that the ends justify the means, however difficult or unpleasant
(d) reduce the distance to the goal by creating and reaching subgoals (28)

4. In Greeno’s account of how we understand problems, correspondence refers to the match between
(a) strategies developed on prior problems, and the current problem
(b) the current problem space and more general, schematic knowledge
(c) our personality style and whether the problem solution is convergent or divergent
(d) the elements or facts of the problem, and our mental model of those elements (15)

5. We know that if it rains, the game will be cancelled. We learn that the game was cancelled; our conclusion that it rained is
(a) deductively valid
(b) deductively invalid but inductively likely (22)
(c) deductively likely
(d) both deductively and inductively true

6. Alba (1992) pitted the number of arguments, against the quality of arguments, concerning various issues. He found that
(a) the number of arguments outweighed the quality of those arguments
(b) the quality outweighed the number
(c) the number of arguments became more important when choices were delayed two days (23)
(d) the quality of arguments became more important when choices were delayed two days

7. Our physician says there’s only a 2% chance we’ll die as a result of elective surgery to correct our defective sense of humor. One reason we might agree to have the procedure is that
(a) the problem is posed in terms of a loss (we’ll die) (22)
(b) we’ve made the error of affirming the consequent
(c) our “mental model” or simulation of the outcome doesn’t including dying
(d) we thought he was kidding about the risk
We tend, other things being equal, to be more willing to take risks when the decision is framed in terms of losses (lives lost, in Kahneman’s disease problem).

8. It was suggested in class that solving any problem requires use of what three stages or processes?
(a) Elaboration, effort, and closure
(b) Encoding, storage, and retrieval of solutions
(c) Sensory, short-term, and long-term memory
(d) Preparation, production, and evaluation (28)

9. The “necklace” problem was solved more often after a rest period after the initial unsuccessful attempts, than with continued work (Silviera). Recent work by Wagner (2004) in which subjects had to find the pattern behind letter sequences, suggests that the rest period might be even more effective if during the rest period we
(a) work intensely on other similar problems
(b) listen to music
(c) do nothing
(d) sleep (27)

10. Nisbett’s (1983) study of students’ willingness to generalize from samples of different sizes for classes of Oceana objects such as shreeble birds, showed clearly that those students
(a) treated small samples as just as representative as large ones
(b) treated small samples as more representative than large ones
(c) were sensitive to when small samples should, and should not, be considered representative (20)
(d) demonstrated a belief in “illusory correlation” in several conditions
For obesity, the rated proportions went up dramatically with sample size, as it should; for bird color, much “flatter” function, and much higher rated proportions even iwht a sample of one – as it should be, given what we know about variation (or the lack of it) within a particular bird species. These results show that if we frame the problem in a way that makes the law of large numbers salient, people reason quite rationally.

11. We suggested that illusory correlations, such as believing in “lucky” objects or habits, could be caused by
(a) an inherent belief in supernatural causes of events
(b) invalid conversion of logical premises
(c) biased availability for the co-occurrence of certain events (26)
(d) the “representativeness” heuristic

12. I give you the choice of two lottery tickets: 1,2,3,4,5,6 or 5,14,18,21,33,41. You pick the second because
(a) it’s more likely to be a winning ticket
(b) it’s the ages of your family members
(c) it looks more like a random drawing (30)
(d) The first ticket was the winner last week

13. The “belief bias” in deductive reasoning occurs when
(a) real-world knowledge affects judgments of validity (27)
(b) knowledge of logical rules misleads people on real-world problems
(c) people who believe they’re not capable of solving such problems, fail
(d)  categorical problems are mistakenly treated as conditional ones

14. When faced with a positive test for a disease, people’s judgments of the probability that they have the disease
(a) often don’t take into account the “base rate” of the disease (26)
(b) are unaffected by whether the test is “diagnostic” or not
(c) depend on how easily they can imagine themselves getting the disease
(d) are biased by whether they think there’s a treatment or not

15. As we try to solve the anagram THGSO, we may be helped because (for example) we know that no words start with TG---. This is a good example of
(a) random but systematic search
(b) heuristic, space-constraining search (17)
(c) means-end analysis
(d) verbal set

16. In Luchins’ “water jug” problems, solving prior problems with similar solutions (i.e., A – 2C – B) led to
(a) a “mental set” that hindered performance with problems with different solution sequences (26)
(b) better performance with a wide range of other versions of the problem
(c) better performance on a wide range of other problems
(d) no transfer at all to other versions or problems

17. Some claim that we should consider alternatives to Darwin’s theory of evolution as equally valid because it’s “only a theory, not a fact.” Such reasoning
(a) is logically sound
(b) denies the consequent of the argument
(c) ignores the fact that hypotheses can have different degrees of “inductive strength” or evidence (27)
(d) is based on faulty premises

18. We’ve argued that the “beer drinking” version of Wason’s selection task (If drinking beer, then must be 21 or older, Griggs & Cox, 1982) is much easier than the original “If vowel, then even number” version because
(a) it makes the deductive nature of the problem clear
(b) it’s posed in concrete rather than abstract terms (1 pt)
(c) it activates an appropriate “permission” schema (18)
(d) it makes it clear that this is an inductive problem
It’s not concreteness as such that makes it easy – recall that people did badly on Rip’s “If the chair is green, the light is on” version – very concrete, but “schematicvally” peculiar, like the monster grow/shrink problem. Similarly, the “postal rate” problem was difficult for American students, who didn’t have experience with the rule about postal permissions. But one point for (b), since Goldstein uses the terms “concrete” and “abstract” to contrast which problem he’s discussing.

19. Finding that I hadn’t brought a spoon with me for a picnic, I ate my yogurt with a plastic tire iron that I carry in my bicycle repair bag. I was overcoming
(a) absentmindedness
(b) functional fixedness (30)
(c) germophobia
(d) modus tolens

20. Gick and Holyoak (1983) found that when students were presented with Duncker's radiation problem after a story that contains an analogous solution (the fortress problem)
(a) few students utilized the analogy, even when told about it
(b) almost all the students spontaneously utilized the analogy
(c) some spontaneously utilized the analogy, but a strong hint helped many more (26)
(d) they tried to attack the tumor with storm troopers

21. In class, I told you of the woman who had been hit in the back of the head with a warm biscuit, and of my “Discovery” of the naked hot-headed ice-borer. My point was that
(a) scientific theories are difficult to prove
(b) inductive reasoning may be hindered by ignoring potential hypotheses (21)
(c) the “representativeness” heuristic may sometimes be misapplied
(d) it is important to search for analogies in memory when reasoning in everyday life

22. If I decide I need to turn over all the cards in Wason’s card selection task (A, K, 4, 7) to test the rule “if vowel on one side, even number on the other,” I probably have
(a) correctly solved the problem
(b) made the logical error of affirming the antecedent
(c) erroneously treated this conditional problem as a categorical syllogism
(d) interpreted the conditional as a “biconditional” rule (20)

23. The view of problem solving that emerged from the information-processing approach (e.g., GPS) stresses
(a) developing and applying heuristics to “move through the problem space” toward the goal (21)
(b) avoiding functional fixedness and “mental set”
(c) exploring individual differences in creative problem-solving potential
(d) the interaction of the two cerebral hemispheres for “rational” and “intuitive” approaches

24. Studies of deductive reasoning that we’ve discussed suggest that
(a) males, at least, are innately logical
(b) people often reason logically, but from misunderstood premises (25)
(c) inductive problems are often erroneously treated as deductive ones
(d) logical reasoning skill doesn’t mature until about middle school

25. The “mutilated checkerboard” problem is rarely solved right away. Why?
(a) The mutilation creates a great deal of anxiety among subjects
(b) critical aspects of the problem, like the color of the missing squares,  are not noticed (30)
(c) the typical subject is more familiar with chess than checkers
(d) the problem is not interesting enough to motivate subjects to “search the space”

26. Utility theory of decison-making says that we should choose the action with the “best average outcome.” Research suggests that people
(a) follow this rule fairly closely, at least for important decisions
(b) tend to be more risk-seeking than they should, even when the payoffs are equal
(c) can be dramatically affected by how the problem is framed (24)
(d) usually pick the action with the worst average outcome

27. Errors on categorical problems of logic (All A are B…) can occur because people
(a) make an invalid inference
(b) fail to make a valid inference
(c) fail to systematically explore combinations of premises
(d) all the above (26)

28. My final words of wisdom to you, and your peers from 1973 to 2008, were that
(a) no chairs are green, and all chairs are green
(b) the exam key will be posted by Friday
(c) If you’re not a Gator, you’re Gator Bait
(d) A love of learning is the guide of life (Philosophia Biou Kibernetes – the more literal translation being, Love of Wisdom – the Helmsman of Life). (29)
Still, I’m impressed by the person that chose (a)